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Abstract. Technological innovation plays an important role in the process of long-run 
growth. There are many studies on the country and aggregate level innovativeness, patents, 
etc. This paper, on the contrary, focuses on two individual innovations, float glass and safety 
glass manufacturing technology, introduced in the late 1950s and the inter-linkage of these 
innovations in Finland. The flat glass and safety glass industries were both international and 
very tightly interlinked. We illustrated the evolution of the flat glass industry and its value-
added industries. The government policy towards foreign companies is tracked, as well. The 
study period is from 1960 to 1985.  
 
JEL classification: L16, M16, O33, O38. 
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Introduction  
 
Technological innovation plays an important role in the process of long-run growth 
(Furman and Porter, 2002). There are a lot of studies on country level innovativeness, patents, 
etc. (Furman and Porter, 2002) The focus of this paper is on two individual innovations, float 
glass, and Lamino safety glass technologies, and the understanding of the inter-linkage 
between two innovations from a perspective of a small economy, that of Finland. Float glass 
was introduced in 1959 in the UK while Lamino safety glass technology in the late 1950s in 
Finland. We track the change caused by two innovations in the Finnish flat glass industry and 
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value-added industries, the safety glass and multi glass unit (MGU) industries. We give a 
special focus on the role and abilities of policy-makers. The study period is 35 years from 
1960-1985. 
The aim of the paper is to get an understanding of the inter-linkage of two 
innovations, float glass and safety glass machinery. The Finnish industries were compact, had 
international contacts and were relatively well documented. From the innovations perspective, 
the linkages with neighboring countries are thus crucial, and they should also be facilitated by 
policy-makers (Boschma, 2004). A Central-European multinational company (MNC), 
Pilkington has been identified as the key change agent shaping the evolution of the industries 
in the 1970s and the 1980s, Uusitalo (1995, 1997a&b and 2009), Uusitalo and Mikkola 
(2010) and Mikkola and Uusitalo (2010). We use evolutionary economics (Boschma and 
Sotarauta, 2007) in analyzing the policy aspects. The inter-linkage of innovation is 
conceptualized within the fit of innovations within an acquisition. The fit is analyzed by the 
core competence (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990) offered by of a small entrepreneurial firm 
(SEF), the position of SEF in the acquiring foreign MNC’s factory network (Ferdows, 1997) 
and the characteristics (Burns and Stalker, 1961) of the acquiring foreign MNC.  
We have the following research questions: 
- What is the role of government in the evolution of industries?  
- How to recognize the inter-linkage of innovations?  
The research methodology for studying long-term impacts of innovations is a 
longitudinal, historical case study (Yin, 1984). Since there are inter-linkages between 
industries and between countries and regions, a rich contextual case study works.  
The rest of the paper is developed in three sections. In the beginning, a brief literature 
review is done on the connectedness of firms and industries, national system of innovation 
(NSI), evolutionary economics, an international factory network within an MNC and core 
competence. Then, a discussion on methodology follows. The empirical part includes first, a 
brief history of the Finnish national system of innovation and second, the evolution of the 
Finnish flat glass industry and its value added such as safety glass and MGU industries. 
Finally, the role and way of the Government and the understanding of inter-linkage of 
innovations are discussed. This section includes theoretical and managerial implications plus 
suggestions for further research. 
 
Literature 
 
Håkansson and Snehota (1989) emphasize the interdependence between the 
companies and the networks: “no business is an island”. According to them in strategic 
management business is primarily seen as a production function focusing to operate (internal 
resources) based on the criterion of efficiency. Instead, companies should be seen as 
transaction functions and they should shift focus “away from the control of resources towards 
the integration of resources and away from the management of acting towards the 
management of reacting”. 
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There exists a rich literature on the national system of innovation (NSI), which also 
includes the government innovations policy (Lundvall, 2010b, Freeman, 1982/2004). Dosi, 
Pavitt and Soete (1990) related the innovation to the foreign trade while Freeman and Soete 
(1988) analyzed employment issues related to technical innovation. Pavitt’s (1984) taxonomy 
helped to understand how different sectors interact and fulfill different functions in the whole 
innovation process. Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (2000) introduced Triple Helix model to 
combine universities, companies, and the government. Porter (1990) has argued that 
competitive advantage is created and sustained through a localized process. 
Evolutionary economists claim that nations and regions sooner or later will face a 
decline in their economies (Maskell and Malmberg, 1999). The long-term competitiveness of 
a country and a region rests on its capabilities to upgrade the economic base by creating 
variety, to phase out variety-destroying processes due to exits and imitation (Boschma, 2004). 
According to evolutionary theory, the emergence of new basic variety (such as new sectors) is 
very hard to predict. New paths cannot be planned and foreseen. They emerge quite 
spontaneously and unexpectedly (Boschma and Lambooy, 1999). Thus, policy-makers have to 
cope with uncertainty when promoting economic renewal and restructuring in their countries 
and regions (Moreau, 2004). The history of countries and regions will have an impact on 
available options and probable outcomes of policies that focus on developing new growth 
paths (Boschma, 2005). Thus, growth trajectories will not come out of the blue, but will 
reveal patterns of historical continuity (Boschma and Sotarauta, 2007). 
Evolutionary economy theory sees that in policy-making one should be more sensitive 
to identifying the potential for emergent developments and routes to the future, and to finding 
the best possible policy-making ways to each situation, location and time in question, 
recognizing the emerging processes and not creating totally new invented policies from 
scratch. In fact, this suggests that policy-makers ought to know much better what is going in 
their own region to build on existing strengths and capabilities in regions to stimulate 
innovation (Lambooy and Boschma, 2001). Another key aim of evolutionary innovation 
policy is to connect agents with the purpose of facilitating knowledge transfer. The 
evolutionary policy should provide access to information. Access to variety is important for 
innovations because it triggers new ideas, but it provides complementary assets needed for the 
development of innovations, as well. The policy should focus on facilitating connections with 
non-local agents. The higher the number of connections with the outside world, the more 
information, and the more variety is brought into the region through extra-territorial linkages 
(Boschma, 2004). Thus, the access to variety and information, internal and external to the 
respective region, is crucial in development. 
Ferdows (1997) classifies strategic roles of the factories within a MNC based on the 
extent of technical activities and primary strategic reasons (access to low cost production, use 
of local technological resources and proximity to market) for the site. Lead factories serve as 
partners of headquarters in building strategic capabilities in the manufacturing function. These 
factories usually are the sole or major producer of certain products or components for 
companies’ global markets (Ferdows, 1997). Core competencies can be seen of as consisting 
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of bodies of technological expertise (both products and processes) and the organizational 
capacity to deploy that expertise effectively. They reinforced through continued continuous 
use and were therefore to some extent firm-specific, non-transferable and difficult to imitate 
(Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). 
The technical capacity transfer involves the transfer of scientific knowledge and the 
capacity to develop new technology. Technical skills are often tacit, context-dependent and 
embedded in individual and teams. The efficient transfer is, therefore, difficult. It often 
requires the creation of an atmosphere or culture to allow communication and to learn to take 
place. Mutual trust, appreciation of each other’s competence and acceptance of common goals 
is needed, as well (Håkanson, 1995). Datta's (1991) found that differences in top management 
styles have a negative impact on performance even in low levels of managerial integration. 
According to Jemison and Sitkin (1986) the strategic fit, while important, is not a sufficient 
condition for superior acquisition performance. The synergies must be realized through 
effective post-acquisition integration. Symbiosis is characterized by a high degree of 
interdependence because substantial technical capability transfers must take place 
(Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). Burns and Stalker (1961) identified organic and mechanistic 
organization structure. The first one should be more suitable for an innovative organization.  
 
Research methodology 
 
Our case study may be described as longitudinal, historical and contextual. We use 
multiple case study method and multiple data sources (such as industry and company 
histories, business, trade and academic journals plus interviews with the industry experts) in 
this study (Yin, 1984). The single case can represent a significant contribution to knowledge 
and theory building. A longitudinal case study can usually better capture firm dynamics over 
time (Pettigrew, 1990; Siggelkow, 2007). The most important is the depth of the analysis, 
both in terms of the number of factors studied and sources of information used (Yin, 1984). A 
single case analysis is the best way to get a holistic picture and understanding of the research 
problem. Patton (1990, p. 95) has argued that "qualitative inquiry is highly appropriate for 
studying processes because depicting a process requires detailed description.”  
Porter (1980) points out that in an industry analysis there are important benefits in 
getting an overview of the industry first, and only then focusing on the specifics. First, I had 
to get an overview of the industry before I focused the specifics. The teaching case (Uusitalo, 
1993) was a tool to achieve an overview. According to him, experience has shown that a 
broad understanding can help the researcher to spot important items of data when studying 
sources and organize data more effectively as they are collected. Porter (1981) also stresses 
the value of in-depth industry histories in understanding industry environments and 
identifying firms' strategic interactions on a longitudinal basis. 
To improve the validity of our “analysis” we used the triangulation methods described 
by Jick (1979) and Pettigrew (1990) to construct case studies from a variety of information 
sources: personal interviews with 1993-2012 (business managers in Pilkington for instance Sir 
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Antony Pilkington, Chairman of Pilkington, Jonas Borup, MD of Lahti Glass Works, Erkki 
Artama, Lamino Pilkington Automotive; Prof. Barker, the author of three histories, and Prof. 
Pearson, a former Pilkington employee, Bror Wahlroos, Secretary General 1969-1992, 
Ministry of Trade and Industry), company and industry histories written by professional 
historians (Barker, 1977 and 1994; Hast, 1991; Daviet, 1989; PPG, 1967 and 1983; Spoerer et 
al., 1987), industry and technology studies or books (Berg, 1984; Doyle, 1979; Persson, 1969; 
Pilkington, 1963 and 1976; Takahashi and Ichinose, 1980), business periodicals (Mushakoji, 
1986; Salmans, 1980; Wierzynski, 1968), books written by businessmen, company 
correspondence, academic studies (Frederiksen, 1974; Skeddle, 1977) and journals, news 
clippings from the mass media, statistics and trade journals (The Glass Industry and Ceramic 
Industry Magazine; all from the area 1950-1984). 
Archival records (i.e. industry statistics, production volumes, import, and export) were 
also used (Uusitalo, 1997a&b). The statistics can be regarded as reliable source. The 
documentation of the data and archival records are filed in chronological order. The analysis 
of the data is important in the case of explanatory and causal studies. Internal validity can be 
enhanced by doing pattern recognition (Mintzberg, 1979) or seeing the evidence through 
multiple lenses (Eisenhardt, 1989). Table 1 provides a list of different perspectives.  
 
Table 1. Viewing the research phenomenon from different perspectives 
 
Perspective Focus of analysis 
Technology Plate, sheet and float glass manufacturing 
processes 
Safety glass manufacturing technologies 
Technology transfer Wholly-owned subsidiary, licensing or joint 
venture 
Industry The plate glass, sheet glass and safety glass 
industries 
Economy 
  large 
The UK, France, Germany 
small Scandinavian countries (including Finland) 
Global Licensing of float glass 
Global Licensing of float glass 
large (MNC) Pilkington, St. Gobain, PPG, Asahi Glass 
small Sheet glass and safety glass manufacturers 
Vertical integration The safety glass and MGU -industries 
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Flat glass industry, innovations and related industries 
 
This chapter provides an empirical illustration first of the Finnish national innovation 
system (NSI) or policy and then the flat glass technologies and value-added products. Two 
innovations, float glass and safety glass machinery, are also discussed briefly. This chapter 
also includes the description the evolution of the flat glass, safety glass and MGU industries. 
 
The Finnish national system of innovation (NSI) 
 
There is always an interaction between industrial, economic and social structure and 
public policy orientation that impact on the structure of the innovation system and policies 
(Lemola, 2002). The basic foundations of technology and science policies or NSI were partly 
built in the 1960s, but mainly in the 1970s and 1980s. The aim of them was to lift the 
technological level of Finnish industries and to reduce the dependence on raw material-driven 
production and exports. The Finnish National Fund for Research and Development (Sitra), 
was established in 1967 to support industrial R&D. Moreover, the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry began in 1968 to support the research and product development of firms, and it also 
received an additional appropriation for goal-oriented technical research. At the end of the 
1970s, Finland’s research and development (R&D) expenditure relative to gross domestic 
product (GDP) was one of the lowest in the industrialized countries. A key matter in the early 
1980s was to make technology policy more target-orientated and systematic. (Hermans et al., 
2005) To fulfill these tasks, Tekes (The National Technology Agency) was founded in 1983. 
In Oulu, for example, the first technology center of the Nordic Countries was established in 
1984 (Lemola, 2002).  
During the 1990s, there was a clear shift of emphasis in innovation and industrial 
policies. While in the 1980s policy thinking was more or less based on the idea of picking the 
winner’s, policies adopted in the 1990s can be labeled as enabling policies. The emphasis 
moved towards indirect measures in influencing firm behavior, avoiding direct interventions 
in the product market, promoting competition, and providing a stable macroeconomic 
environment. (Hermans et al., 2005) In 1990, the concept of an NSI as a framework for 
science and technology policies was introduced to illustrate the systemic nature of innovation. 
The innovation process and policies should be looked from a broad perspective ranging from 
education and science to innovative activities of firms and commercialization of technological 
innovations (Miettinen, 2002). Finland can be regarded as one of the few countries that have 
developed a consistent approach towards a network and cluster facilitating innovation policy 
(Schienstock and Hämäläinen 2001). 
 
Flat glass technologies and processed product with their raw materials 
 
As late as the mid-1970s two different sub-industries existed in the flat glass industry 
(see Figure 1). The plate glass industry was much more concentrated, and companies were 
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larger than those in the sheet glass (window glass is used as a synonym) sub-industry. Every 
plate glass manufacturer also made sheet glass, which did not require such expensive 
machinery. The peripheral markets, such as Scandinavia, were fragmented, and producers 
operated in national markets. Float glass was introduced in the plate glass and the sheet glass 
industries in 1959 and in 1968-70, respectively. In the late 1960s and the mid-1970s, float 
glass overtook the plate glass and the sheet glass processes, respectively (see Figure 2 for the 
case in the US). The flat glass industry became a single industry. 
Safety glass (both laminated and tempered) and MGUs are two types of processed flat 
glass products (see Figure 3). Less expensive tempered safety glass is used in the side and rear 
windows of cars and carriages while the laminated glass is for security and windshields. 
Safety glass was invented in the 1920s. Single glazing gives unsatisfactory insulation against 
cold and sound in windows. Prefabricated insulating glass units are preferred to two or three 
individual panes of glass in a window. The MGU units were developed in the US and 
Germany in the 1930s. 
 
 
Figure 1: The Division of flat glass (industries) 
 
 
 
Source: Uusitalo (1995) 
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Figure 2: The US flat glass production in 1959 to 1977 
 
 
Source: Uusitalo (2014) 
 
Figure 3: Processed value added products and their raw material 
 
 
 
 
Source: Uusitalo (1995) 
 
 
Flat glass industry 
 
This chapter illustrates the flat glass industry in three areas, Central Europe, 
Scandinavia and Finland plus the float glass innovation. 
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Central Europe  
 
Two large local companies, Pilkington (founded in 1826) from the UK and St. Gobain 
(founded in 1665) from France have produced both in sheet and plate glass throughout the 
twentieth century. In the mid-1920s both of them began to produce plate glass with a 
continuous casting, grinding and polishing methods. At the same time, they entered the safety 
glass business. St. gobain had been interested in the Scandinavian market since the mid-1940s 
when it acquired 30% from the Swedish flat glass manufacturer, Emmaboda. Pilkington 
looked in the late 1960s at the Scandinavian flat glass and the safety glass market when it 
bought the first Swedish windshield manufacturer, Sunex to acquire a marketing channel for 
its float glass sales.  
 
The float glass innovation 
 
Pilkington introduced float glass in 1959 (Barker, 1994). In 1962, it built its second 
and third float glass lines. In 1967, the company closed its last plate glass line. The company 
decided to license the technology. In 1962, the first license was old to the U.S. based PPG. In 
the late 1960s and in the early 1970s, St. Gobain invested in nine float glass lines. By 1970, 
Pilkington and St., Gobain introduced float glass in the sheet glass industry. They also became 
interested in the Scandinavian sheet glass market. Concentration in the flat glass industry took 
place. Since 1970, the German flat glass industry was owned by foreign companies. BSN 
(Boussois-Souchon-Neuvesel) acquired the German Flachglass and the Belgian plate and 
sheet glass manufacturer, Glaverbel, in 1970 and in 1972, respectively. In 1979 BSN 
withdrew from the flat glass industry by selling its French operation to PPG from the U.S., its 
German operations (Flachglas) to Pilkington, and its Belgian operations (Glaverbel) to Asahi 
Glass from Japan.  
 
Scandinavia 
 
By 1960 in Scandinavia (including Finland) there were seven independent sheet glass 
manufacturers (Korsör in Denmark, Lahti Glass Works (LGW), Riihimäki and Valke in 
Finland, Drammen in Norway and Emmaboda plus Gränges/Oxelösund in Sweden). In the 
1960s all companies, except Valke, manufactured MGUs, as well. Plate glass was never 
manufactured in Scandinavia. In the 1950s, all Scandinavian manufacturers used the 
European Fourcault technology. In 1959 (added capacity 1968) and in 1966 Emmaboda and 
Drammen started PPG machines, respectively. In 1969 in Denmark Scanglas (a merger 
between Öxelösund and Korsör) and in Finland LGW started new PPG plants, as well. In 
1974, LGW added two more PPG machines. In 1974, Riihimäki licensed technology from the 
Japanese Asahi Glass (Takahashi and Ichinose, 1980) to modernize its Fourcault machines. At 
the same time the Scandinavian safety glass and MGU industries grew.  
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In 1973, local sheet glass producers tried to form, together with either St. Gobain or 
Pilkington, a joint float glass manufacturing company, Scandifloat. However, the project 
failed since Pilkington wanted the majority ownership in the project, and Emmaboda was sold 
to St. Gobain in 1974. In 1974, Pilkington started massive imports from Scandinavia to 
achieve a market share and distribution outlets for its float glass plant (started in 1976) in 
Sweden. The struggle for capacity in the market created a price war in Scandinavia in the 
mid-1970s. This was called a Great Glass War. By 1978 St. Gobain had bought the Swedish, 
Norwegian and Danish flat glass producers. In 1978, Pilkington acquired a 50 per cent share 
in LGW. The market was controlled totally by two large Central-European MNCs. In less 
than 20 years, seven independent local flat glass manufacturers had disappeared. By 1984, 
sheet glass production was terminated in Scandinavia. 
  
Finland 
 
In 1967 three companies, LGW 58%, Riihimäki 22% and Valke 20 %, produced the 
domestic supply of flat glass (45,000 tons). Five strong central wholesalers took care of the 
domestic sales. Around 7.5% of the demand was imported. Import duties and the lack of size 
standardization restricted imports. Finnglas was an export organization created by the local 
flat glass manufacturers. Flat glass export accounted 13% of production. In the 1950s and 
1960s the European as well as the Finnish sheet glass manufacturers had successful exports to 
the U.S. Overall, the flat glass industry was characterized by slow growth, dependence on the 
building sector and cost increases in labor and raw materials (Sitra, 1970). In 1969, LGW and 
Riihimäki formed a cartel by sharing the domestic market; the former made MGUs and the 
latter safety glass for the construction industry. With its new plant, LGW was able to meet all 
demand in Finland. In the early 1970s, the export to the U.S. shrank because float glass had 
started to compete with sheet glass, as well. In 1972, Valke left the industry. In 1974, LGW 
bought a local safety glass manufacturer, Autolasi. At the same time, LGW had troubles to 
mount two additional machines. A one-year production stop created a shortage of flat glass. 
Meanwhile, a Finnish wholesaler owned by Finnish glaziers, Lasitukku, imported 
huge amounts of Pilkington's float glass. It also controlled most of the distribution system. As 
we saw, the Scandifloat project was terminated. Emmaboda canceled the export agreement 
with LGW. The huge overcapacity in the market presaged a price war. Large investments, 
warehouses full of glass and rapidly changed market conditions put LGW in a critical 
financial condition. It had to two alternatives; either quitting or cooperating with one of the 
two large Central-European MNCs. In 1975, Riihimäki temporarily discontinued its sheet 
glass production. One year earlier the company had acquired a license from Asahi to 
modernize its existing obsolescent machines.   
In 1976, the Finnish Government decided neither to make LGW as a state-owned 
company nor prevent companies importing flat glass. At the same year, LGW promised to 
Pilkington to lower its production and to continue its sheet glass production only for three 
years. Then LGW would manufacture only MGUs. The Government let the price of flat glass 
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rise 25%. Next year a committee evaluating the Finnish glass industry suggested that only 
LGW would continue its sheet glass production. In 1978 Pilkington, the Finnish Government 
and the financing bank of LGW arranged the ownership (Pilkington 50%, the bank 25%, two 
Finnish private companies 10% and a government 5%) of LGW. Bror Wahlroos, Secretary 
General, Ministry of Trade and Industry, lead the two-year long negotiations. The furnace was 
repaired and sheet glass production continued until 1984 when a float glass plant investment 
decision of €50 million was made. The float glass line (70,000 tons/year) was inaugurated in 
1987. The ownership of LGW was as follows: Pilkington (44%), the Finnish Government 
(33%) and Finnish private companies (23%). Wahlroos represented the Finnish Government 
again. Appendix 1 summarizes the events in the flat glass, safety glass, and MGU industries.  
 
The safety glass machinery innovation and the Finnish safety glass industry 
 
Lamino was found in 1949. In 1957, the first laminated curved windscreens for busses 
were manufactured. In the early 1960s, the U.S. plastic supplier Monsanto became interested 
in the safety glass manufacturing process of Lamino and offered to export them to the 
developing countries. However, the first safety glass machinery line was delivered to the U.K. 
in 1963. After that, Lamino sold numerous manufacturing lines to Europe and South America. 
It also licensed manufacturing technology to two companies in Sweden. In the early-1970s, 
Lamino concentrated on safety glass manufacturing. In 1975, the owner family sold Lamino, 
the largest manufacture in Scandinavia, sold to Pilkington with the approval of the 
Government. Bror Wahlroos arranged the sale of Lamino to Pilkington. The raw material 
supply was the main reasons for the sale for Lamino and the guarantee of float glass sales for 
Pilkington. LGW became also interested in buying Lamino. Under Pilkington, Lamino grew 
rapidly. In 1979, Lamino acquired Nordlamex, another Finnish safety glass producer. In the 
late 1980s, Lamino had 50 per cent share in the European windscreen market for buses, and it 
also delivered windscreens as genuine spare parts to the Japanese Toyota and Mitsubishi cars 
in Europe. In 1992, Lamino’s turnover was €75 million, it had 900 employees and exported 
87 per cent of its production to 35 countries. The Finnish safety glass industry has grown 
remarkably within thirty years (see Appendix 2). 
 
Finnish MGU industry 
 
The MGU-product market expanded in the early 1970s. Lahti had played a leading 
role, or it had even a monopoly in this industry since the company had introduced Polarpane 
products on the Finnish market in the mid-1960s. The Polarpane technology was sublicensed 
from a Swedish flat glass manufacturer in 1965. Through advertisements and promotion 
campaigns, Lahti created demand for MGU products. However, many glaziers, Lahti's 
customers, and other companies also became interested in MGU products. After float glass 
was introduced in Finland in 1963 the power of local flat glass manufacturers was diluted, and 
new comers entered the industry (see Table 2). LGW was competing with several local firms. 
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Table 2: Largest MGU-producers in 1975-76 
 
Source: Talouselämä 26/1975 
 
Discussions and conclusions 
                           
As we saw the Finnish national system of innovation was basically developed not 
until the 1990s, which means that the models / taxonomies created by Lundvall (2010b), 
Freeman, (1982/2004), Dosi, Pavitt and Soete (1990), Pavitt (1984) and Freeman and Soete 
(1988) do not explain the involvement of the policy-maker in the Finnish flat glass industry. 
Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff’s (2000) Triple Helix model combining universities, companies, 
and the government is not valid either since such kind of co-operation did not exist in Finland 
in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Bror Wahlroos, Secretary General, Ministry of Trade and Industry, was a well-
educated person, had the industrial background and was an eager reader. He must have been 
also diplomatic since he had to get along with 25 ministers during his career in the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry.  
In the 1950s, two pertinent innovations took place. In Finland, Lamino started 
working on the flat glass to manufacture windscreens. Lamino’s consistent quality of 
windscreens provided real customer value for the local bus manufacturer. In the 1950s three 
windscreen manufacturers, Muotolasi, Autolasi and Nordlamex, and in 1970 one, Tamglass, 
emerged as spin-offs from the company. Lamino’s manufacturing technology was well known 
word-wide. The company and the safety glass industry grew rapidly in the 1960s and the 
1970s.  
In the meantime, Pilkington invented float glass process which accelerated the 
globalization of the flat glass industry. Large flat glass producers became interested in safety 
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glass firms as distribution outlets. Pilkington had already in the 1930s acquired safety glass 
manufacturers in the Common Wealth countries to guarantee the sales of plate glass (Barker, 
1977). In 1968 and 1973 Pilkington acquired two Swedish firms, which used Lamino’s 
manufacturing technology. In the early 1970s, Lamino imported cheap float glass from a U.S. 
based newcomer, Guardian Industries. In 1971, Lamino managed to enter the UK safety glass 
market during the six weeks strike in Pilkington. Triplex, the daughter company of Pilkington, 
had after the strike difficulties in gaining back the domestic safety glass market. With these 
incidents and connections, Pilkington and Lamino had noticed each other. Lamino and 
Nordlamex were sold to Pilkington in 1975 and 1979, respectively. Under Pilkington, these 
firms grew rapidly (see Appendix 2).  
After imported float glass had become available in Finland, the MGU industry was no 
more LGW’s monopoly. Float glass broke the existing rigid value chain. The era of the mid-
1970s was called the Great Glass War throughout Scandinavia (see Appendix 1). 
As was mentioned Wahlroos was involved in the arrangement of the Finnish flat glass 
and safety glass industries. Already in 1970 just after joining the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry he was involved at the end state of Sitra’s (1970) study of the Finnish flat glass 
industry. By the way, Sitra’s study did not include the value added industries, the safety glass, 
and MGU industries. Neither did it mention Lasitukku, which started to import Pilkinton’s 
float glass in the early 1970s. Very soon, Wahlroos created a vision that the flat glass and 
safety glass industries were closely inter-linked. Moreover, the Finnish markets would be 
linked to the globalizing European market, as well. For instance, since 1970 the German flat 
glass manufacturers were owned by foreign companies although the strong German industry 
endowment.  
In 1975 while arranging the sale of Lamino to Pilkington Wahlroos has linked several 
matters: 1) Pilkington had licensed very strictly (not to destroy the industry) float glass (see 
Wierzynski, 1969); 2) float glass was globalizing the industry; 3) Germany had no domestic 
flat glass producers; 4) float glass was taking over sheet glass (see Figure 2 in the U.S.); 5) 
sheet glass manufacturing had no future (allow Pilkington buy Lamino although the local 
LGW was interested and during the Lamino negotiation keep in mind a solution for the 
Finnish flat glass); 6) the MGU industry was no longer LGW’s monopoly; 7) there was no 
need to put import duties on float glass; 8) Lamino was a competent manufacturer but it was 
not possible for it to survive alone; 9) Pilkington could provide raw material for Lamino; 10) 
Moreover, Chairman Lord Pilkington (1969) illustrated the ethical code of the Pilkington 
company by saying:  
 “There are two schools of thought. One (the second) believes that business is only 
shortsighted and selfish, in the late 19th-century image; this is widely believed by 
governments everywhere, but specially in developing countries. The other (the first) is that 
business is adult and farsighted, realizing that self-interest should be enlightened, that co-
operation and good conduct pay, that we are 20th and 21st century, not 19th. I believe the first 
school of thought, from long experience, but we in international business have to prove it to 
be true – and do so in the face of growing nationalism.” 
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The impact of Wahlroos inter-linked view of two innovations, float glass and safety 
glass manufacturing technology, is conceptualized in Figure 4. A successful continuation of a 
small entrepreneurial firm (SEF) has three prerequisites. Lamino’s unique manufacturing, sale 
and sourcing capabilities (experienced by Pilkington while acquiring Swedish companies, 
during its strike in the UK and selling float glass in competition with Guardian Industries) 
could provide core competence for Pilkington (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). Before the 
acquisition, Lamino was able to evaluate its position in Pilkington’s factory network 
(Ferdows, 1997). Lamino could earn a lead factory role in Pilkington in Ferdows’ (1997) 
typology. Third, the buying company should have at least organic organisation structure 
(Burns and Stalker, 1961) to be able to allow and guarantee a subtle integration process and 
symbiotic life after the acquisition. 
According to Haspeslagh & Jemison (1991), Granstrand & Sjölander (1990) and 
Håkanson (1995), etc. the integration of a technology based company is a risky process. 
Lamino was sold to Pilkington in 1975. The integration process was subtle. The technical 
director, the son of the founder of Lamino, was nominated to MD. The R&D unit remained 
the same, and no controller came from Pilkington. The integration process of Lamino seemed 
to resemble the symbiosis proposed by Haspeslagh & Jemison (1991). Pilkington’s 
organisation structure seemed to be organic. The acquisition was successful. 
 
Figure 4: The success concept for a small entrepreneurial firm (SEF) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In 1977, he was the chairman of the committee to evaluate what is the further 
arrangement in the Finnish flat glass industry. After LGW was in March 1976 close to 
bankruptcy Wahlroos conducted a two years long negotiation between Pilkington, Finnish 
companies, and the Government in order to continue the sheet glass manufacturing in Finland. 
In the mid-1980s, he was again conducting the negotiations between Pilkington, the Finnish 
companies, and the Government.  
Successful Continuation
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economy within  MNC
Requirements for a SEF:
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Creates Core competence for a
buyer MNC
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Wahlroos had a fresh vision of the inter-linkages between the flat glass (and float 
glass innovation) and safety glass industries (and Lamino’s safety glass manufacturing 
technology) and their belonging to a larger international context. He also recognized the 
emerging safety glass industry as a new developing sector as mentioned by Lambooy and 
Boschma (2001). He enhanced the existing connections of Finnish firms to foreign firms such 
as Pilkington and also facilitated new connections as emphasized by Boschma (2004). It 
seems that Wahlroos personally was executing evolutionary policy (Boschma and Sotarauta, 
2007) himself.  
This paper enlarges Ferdows’ (1997) typology to be used in the analysis of 
acquisitions of SEFs. An SEF can benchmark its position within the factory network of a 
potential buyer MNC.  
According to Porter, (1990) competitive advantage of nations is created and sustained 
through a localized process. Porter’s (1990) diamond for success includes 1) factors of 
production, such as skilled labor or infrastructure, necessary to compete in a given industry, 2) 
the nature of home-market demand for the industry's products, 3) the presences or absence of 
related and supporting industries and 4) firm strategy, structure, and rivalry. It seems that in 
the case of the Finnish safety glass industry and glass tempering solutions the Porter’s (1990) 
does not explain the success of them. As we saw individual entrepreneurs have started the 
industry without any local skilled labor or infrastructure, without home-market demand (no 
for instance car manufacturing), without related industries (the flat glass industry was busy 
with the construction industry) and competition. 
In this kind of study, a longitudinal, contextual case study with rich data is utmost 
important to give a comprehensive view of the evolution of the industry. Studies executed 
purely on quantitative methods may have traps in understanding all events in the evolution of 
industries. One example of comparison between quantitative and qualitative research methods 
is provided by Uusitalo (2014). 
Further research includes two ideas. Since Porter’s (1990) diamond did not explain 
the emergence and growth of the Finnish safety glass industry and glass tempering solutions 
since the 1960s, it would be interesting to study what were the enabling factors. Second, 
recently several Finnish firms have been sold to foreign large MNCs (Vacon to the Danish 
Danfoss, VTI Technologies to the Japanese Murata Electronics) such as Lamino to Pilkington 
in 1975. Lamino’s acquisition was successful as we can see its development in 1975 to 1992 
(Appendix 2). Lamino got resources for production investments and responsibility to take care 
certain markets. It would be interesting to validate within a large sample the conceptualization 
(Figure 4) of the sale of the small entrepreneurial firm to a foreign MNC.  
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Appendix 1. Impact of two innovations on the industries. 
 
Appendix 2. Laminated safety glass export from Finland (for cars and other vehicles) 
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